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 A B S T R A C T  
Domestic institutional shareholders and foreign shareholders differently influence 
firm value. Using panel data from the manufacturing company listed in the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (IDX), from 2014 to 2017, and regression analysis, these types of 
shareholders have a positive and significant impact on the firm value with an inverted 
U-shaped. The influence of domestic institutional share-holders to the firm value is 
more significant than that of the foreign shareholder indicated by the coefficient value 
from the regression results. The best combination of shareholders to obtain the 
optimum firm value are the domestic institutional shareholder no more than 35.26 
percent and the foreign shareholder no more than 47.61 percent. The greater share 
ownership will increase shareholder intervention and benefit the majority 
shareholder. Effective monitoring improvements are needed so that the majority of 
shareholder intervention can be reduced. 
 
 A B S T R A K  
Pemegang saham institusi domestik dan pemegang saham asing secara berbeda 
mempengaruhi nilai perusahaan. Dengan menggunakan data panel dari perusahaan 
manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI), data tahun 2014 hingga 
2017, dan analisis regresi, tipe pemegang saham ini memiliki hubungan positif dan 
signifikan dengan nilai perusahaan dengan bentuk huruf U terbalik. Pengaruh 
pemegang saham institusi domestik terhadap nilai perusahaan lebih signifikan daripada 
pemegang saham asing yang ditunjukkan oleh nilai koefisien dari hasil regresi. 
Kombinasi pemegang saham terbaik untuk mendapatkan nilai perusahaan yang optimal 
adalah porsi pemegang saham institusional domestik tidak lebih dari 35,26 percent dan 
pemegang saham asing tidak lebih dari 47,61 percent. Kepemilikan saham yang lebih 
besar akan meningkatkan intervensi pemegang saham dan menguntungkan pemegang 
saham mayoritas. Perbaikan pemantauan yang efektif diperlukan agar interven-si 
pemegang saham mayoritas dapat dikurangi.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Shareholders establish a firm to increase its wealth 
by enhancing firm value. The management 
appointed by the firm's shareholders has a crucial 
role in increasing the firm value (Brigham & Daves, 
2007). The management and the shareholders have 
different interests in the firm, and this condition 
generates principal-agent theory. Thus, the 
shareholders have a critical requirement to increase 
the firm value by reducing the principal-agent 
problem.  
The influence of the shareholders to the firm 
value is directly by their structure (He & Kyaw, 2018; 
Thanatawee, 2014).  The reduction of firm value can 
increase with increasing share ownership (Wang, 
2018). The concentrated share ownership can affect 
the firm value because some types of shareholders 
have different objectives (Du & Boateng, 2015; Song 
et al., 2015). The shareholder base has a negative 
influence on firm value (Yung & Jian, 2017). The 
shareholders with wide networks strongly and 
positively influence the firm value (Bajo et al., 2020). 
The characteristics of domestic institutional 
shareholders and foreign shareholders are different 
from influencing the firm value. The domestic 
institutional shareholders can influence corporate 
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governance and finally, the firm value with effective 
monitoring: meanwhile, the foreign shareholder 
cannot effectively monitor corporate governance 
(Cahyaningtyas et al., 2017; Herlina, 2017; 
Thanatawee, 2014). However, another paper 
explains that it is the active shareholders that 
monitor firms well (Bajo et al., 2020). Previous 
researches show that the influences of the share-
holders to the firm value are different. This paper 
studies the different effect of the domestic 
institutional shareholders and the foreign 
shareholders to the firm value for manufacturing 
company listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX).  
The manufacturing industry is part of the 
manufacturing industry. Based on data from Bank 
Indonesia, the manufacturing industry contributes 
to the more significant portion of gross domestic 
product (GDP) in Indonesia, 21.28 percent in 2016, 
and 20.97 percent in 2017. This fact is a reason why 
this paper uses the company in the manufacturing 
industry as a sample. The manufacturing industry 
has a crucial effect on the Indonesia economy.  
Using Tobin-Q to measure the firm value from 
the sample in this paper, the firm value fluctuated 
from 2014 to 2017. The firm values are described in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The Firm Value Description by Using Tobin-Q from Sample 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Mean 1,63 1,48 1,58 1,58 
Median 1,11 0,99 0,99 0,96 
Max 11,13 11,66 11,08 12,96 
Minimum 0,27 0,28 0,30 0,36 
Skewness 3,27 3,88 3,73 4,41 
Std. Dev. 1,58 1,48 1,69 1,88 
 
Table 1 describes that the firm values means are 
not consistent or fluctuated. It is decreasing by 9.20 
percent in 2015, from 1.63 to 1.48. In 2016, the firm 
value was increasing by 6.77 percent (from 1.48 to 
1.58). One of the reasons is the change of formal 
ownership because the tax amnesty policy is 
regulated in 2016 and 2017 in Indonesia. This tax 
amnesty policy affects the legal share ownership of 
the firm. Some owners register their shares as 
foreign shareholders. Because the tax amnesty 
policy gives incentive for register ownership of 
shareholders in the domestic, some of the owners 
change their formal share ownership from foreign 
shareholders to be domestic shareholders, as 
domestic institutional shareholders or individual 
domestic shareholders.   
The shareholders influence the firm value, but 
this influence is not always linear. The relation 
between the shareholders with control in the 
company and the firm value is U-shaped (Lozano et 
al., 2016).  To some extent, an increase in ownership 
will increase the value of the company, but after the 
optimal point the increase in ownership will reduce 
the company's profit and value. The shareholders 
with less involvement in the company management, 
such as non-family shareholders, have adverse a 
negative relation to the firm value. 
This paper modifies from the previous 
researches relating to the shareholders and the firm 
value. This paper differentiates the shareholders be 
the domestic institutional shareholder and the 
foreign shareholders that owned more than 5 
percent shares issued. This paper also studies the 
particular threshold of ownership that changing the 
relation of each different shareholder, domestic 
institutional, and foreign shareholders to the firm 
value.  
This paper finds that the relation between the 
shareholders, the domestic institutional, and the 
foreign shareholders and the firm value is positive 
and significant until a certain amount of ownership. 
This relation is inverted U-shaped. At a certain 
amount of share ownership or threshold, the 
relationship between the shareholder and the firm 
value becomes negative. The limit for the domestic 
institutional shareholders is smaller than that of the 
foreign shareholders. By comparing the amount of 
the shareholder's coefficient, the influence of the 
domestic institutional shareholder to the firm value 
is more significant than that of the foreign 
shareholders.  
This paper contributes to the literature related 
to the relationship between shareholders and firm 
value. The differences in the definition of domestic 
institutional shareholders and foreign shareholders 
with previous researchers (such as Thanatawee, 
2014; Bhat, 2017)), and the non-linear relationship 
between shareholders and firm value (such as 
Lozano et al., 2016) will enrich the literature. This 
paper explains that majority shareholders can 
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negatively influence the firm value because 
increased ownership will increase control and 
influence management policies that benefit the 
majority shareholders, as explained by Bona-
Sánchez et al. (2017). 
This paper suggests that the parties concerned 
with the firm value pay attention to the combination 
of share ownership between the domestic 
institutional shareholders and the foreign 
shareholders. The suitable combination of the 
shareholders’ composition can generate the 
optimum firm value. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HY-
POTHESES 
The agency theory emerges because of the 
cooperation of 2 parties with different behaviors. 
These behaviors arise from the agency problem. A 
contract is needed to explain the delegation of 
authority from the principal to the agent. This 
absolute authority can be used to make the 
company's right decision (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
To ensure the agent works for the principal's 
interests, the principal needs to monitor the agent. 
The shareholders, as a principal of the firm, can 
reduce agency problems. The large portion of 
ownership or the large shareholders can direct the 
firm to implement good corporate governance and 
finally affect the firm value (Lozano et al., 2016). 
Activities on the capital market carried out by large 
companies, such as buying or selling shares, can also 
affect the firm value (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). The 
firm value is affected by the company’s growth, 
investment, and profit not distributed as dividends 
(Kaldor, 1966; Setiawan & Pradana, 2020). If these 
three variables are permanent, the firm value can be 
influenced by the demand and supply mechanism of 
the shares in the capital market and corporate 
actions. 
The firm value is measured by comparing two 
different values of the same asset. The first value is 
the market value, and the second value is the 
replacement cost. The market value is the 
numerator, and the replacement cost is as the 
denominator (Tobin & Brainard, 1976). The market 
value is using the securities value in the capital 
market. The replacement cost is difficult to know. 
For convenience, then the replacement cost is using 
the book value. This measuring is called Tobin-Q. 
To achieve the company goal, the shareholders’ 
wealth by the firm value, the agent, or management 
should apply the excellent business strategy 
influencing the finance decision and finally the firm 
value (Giriati, 2016). Thus, the shareholders have to 
make sure that the business strategy should affect 
the firm value. The shareholders’ character 
determines the company behavior and the firm 
business strategy. The state shareholders have 
political goals rather than profit goals for the firm. 
The non-state shareholders are more inclined to the 
firm’s performance and value (Song et al., 2015). The 
state shareholders want the firm's investments are 
increasing because of their political goals. 
Meanwhile, the non-state shareholders, especially 
the management shareholders, are decreasing 
investment financed from free cash flow (He & 
Kyaw, 2018). In this case, the management expects 
the incentive from the excess of the free cash flow. 
Another paper explains that the firm's value with the 
state shareholders will increase because it is easy to 
receive funds (Du & Boateng, 2015). The type of 
shareholder influences how the shareholders 
exercise effective control over the firm with the firm 
value as the ultimate goal (Lozano et al., 2016). The 
relation between the shareholders with sufficient 
monitoring and the firm value is U-shaped. The 
higher the control over the company to a certain 
amount, then the personal desire is smaller, and the 
firm value decreases.  
The relation between insider ownership and 
firm value is positive. In this case, the firm value is 
calculated by the return on asset (ROA), return on 
equity (ROE), and excess return in the industry 
(Oswald & Jahera, Jr, 1991). The insider ownership 
positively affects the firm value measured by the 
price-earnings ratio (PER). When the share 
ownership by an insider is high, the low PER can 
increase (Houmes & Chira, 2015). For the firm’s 
performance measured by Tobin-Q, the non-
financial institution shareholders can improve the 
firm performance; meanwhile, the financial 
institution shareholders have adverse effects on the 
firm performance (Gugle et al., 2003). Ownership by 
the institutional shareholders has a different impact 
on firm performance. Stable share ownership by the 
institutional shareholders will have a positive 
impact on firm performance. 
In contrast, unstable ownership (volatile) by the 
institutional shareholders will harm the firm 
performance (Jafarinejad et al., 2015). A stable means 
that there is no transfer of shares by the institutional 
shareholders within the first-quarter period. The 
higher the ownership by the institutional 
shareholders, the firm value will be higher. 
The institutional shareholders can improve 
corporate governance in the company and finally 
can increase the firm value (Thanatawee, 2014). 
Corporate governance can be enhanced by 
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monitoring through access to technology and 
research (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Most of the 
domestic institutional shareholders in Indonesia are 
long term and not volatile. Therefore, domestic 
institutional shareholders have a positive effect on 
firm value. Previous researches distinguished the 
influence of state shareholders and institutional 
shareholders on the firm value. Previous researches 
also distinguished shareholders who are financial 
institutions and non-institutions. This study does 
not make a distinction between the characters of 
institutional shareholders. The meaning of domestic 
institutional shareholders in this paper is that all 
business entities registered in Indonesia, regardless 
of type and form of business. Therefore, the 
increasing ownership of the domestic institutional 
shareholders has a positive relation to the firm 
value. However, this positive relationship will 
change after pass a particular threshold.  
Besides the domestic institutional shareholders, 
this paper studies the foreign shareholders (FS) and 
their relation to the firm value. Not much research, 
especially in Indonesia, has tried to link foreign 
shareholders' effect on the firm value. In Thailand, 
foreign shareholders cannot monitor how to 
improve corporate governance in the firm 
(Thanatawee, 2014). Therefore, the relation between 
the foreign shareholders to the firm value is weak. 
However, foreign shareholders take the firm’s 
resources at the expense of the minority 
shareholders. 
From the character of the sampling companies 
in this paper, foreign shareholders coming from 
international companies are majority and stable 
share ownership. There is also the fact that the 
owner of some international company is a domestic 
taxpayer, and the period is permanent. Due to the 
tax amnesty policy applied in 2016 and 2017 in 
Indonesia, some foreign shareholders, not many, 
change to the individual domestic shareholders. 
From this fact, some foreign ownership is long-term, 
which positively affects the company's value 
(Jafarinejad et al., 2015). 
From several relationships between the 
shareholders and the firm value, the hypotheses of 
this study are: 
 
H1. The type of shareholders (the domestic 
institutional shareholders and foreign 
shareholders) influences the firm value 
differently.  
 
H2.  Increasing the percentage of share ownership to 
a certain threshold changes relationship 
between the shareholders and the firm value.  
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
This paper is using comparative casual design to 
explain the relationship between a dependent 
variable and independent variables. The firm value 
is a dependent variable influenced by the domestic 
institutional shareholders and foreign shareholders 
as independent variables. This paper sample 
consists of various variations, such as the asset size, 
with a very large difference. For this reason, this 
paper uses control variables, namely, size and 
leverage.  
The size of the company can affect getting the 
optimal economies of scale. On the other hand, the 
size can be a burden if it cannot get optimal asset 
returns (ROA). The large companies can quickly get 
contracts compared to smaller companies, and this 
can affect profits. This size condition can 
undoubtedly change the value of the company. 
Because each company has a different size, this 
paper uses the company's size as a control variable. 
The amount of debt can influence the business 
strategy of the firm. The firms that can still add debt 
have the opportunity to increase investment, which 
affects the firm value. Besides adding investment, 
the new mortgage can be used to pay dividends, and 
the payment of the dividends can influence the firm 
value. Because each company has different leverage 
(the ratio of total debt to total asset), this paper uses 
leverage as a control variable.  
Sampling in this paper is random sampling. 
After obtaining the number of samples using the 
Slovin formula, stratified sampling is taken based on 
the sub-sector manufacturing industry. There are 
three sub-sectors for the manufacturing industry in 
the IDX. The number of samples representing each 
of these sub-sectors is proportional to the population 
composition.  The population and sampling are 
described in Table 2. The Slovin formula as follows: 
 
𝑛𝑛 =  𝑁𝑁
1+𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒2
  
 
𝑛𝑛 = Total Sampling 
N = Total Population 
e     = error margin, 5% 
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Table 2. Total Population and Sample 
No Sub Business Sector Population Sample 
1 Basic Industry and Chemicals 62 46 
2 Miscellaneous  Industry 38 28 
3 Consumer Goods Industry 37 28 
 Total 137 102 
Source: IDX, 2019 
 
The data year in this sample is from 2014 to 
2017. With 102 the sampling companies, the total 
number of samples is 408 observations. The 
dependent variable is the firm value measured by 
Tobin-Q. The measurement of the dependent 
variable, the independent variables, and the control 
variables are explained in Table 3. 
       The regression equation is as follow: 
 
TQ_1it = β0 + β1 DISit  + β2 FSit + β3 Leverageit  
+ β4 Sizeit  + εit          (1) 
 
 
This paper analyzes the relationship between 
shareholders and the value of the company, and the 
change of this relationship if the share ownership 
reaches a specific threshold. Using this threshold, a 
quadratic is performed on the independent variables 
(Chia et al., 2020; Vintilă & Gherghina, 2013), and the 
equation is as follows: 
 
TQ_1it = β0 + β1 DISit  + β2  (DISit )2 + β3 FSit + 
β4 (FSit)2 + β5 Leverageit  + β6 Sizeit  + 
εit            (2)  
 
Table 3. The Variable Measurements 
Variable Definition Indicator 
Dependent Variable: 
Tobin-Q (TQ_1) Ratio to estimate firm value too high or too low  
 
Equity Market Value
Equity Book Value
     
 
Assumption: Market value and the book value of 
liabilities are the same.  
 
Independent Variable: 
Domestic 
Institution 
Shareholder 
(DIS) 
Ratio to describe ownership by the 
domestic institutional shareholders. 
 
Domestic Institutional Shareholders
Shares Issued
 
 
The domestic institutional shareholders include 
corporate, state, and cooperative. This paper does 
not distinguish the types of business shareholders. 
 
Foreign 
Shareholder 
(FS) 
Ratio to describe ownership by the 
foreign shareholders. 
 
Foreign Shareholders
Shares issued
 
 
The foreign shareholders include corporate, 
individual, and investment companies. 
 
Control Variable: 
Leverage Total liabilities of the company compare to total assets.  
 
Total Liabilities
Total Assets
 
 
Size The total asset of the company 
 
Ln (Total Asset) 
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4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
This paper uses panel data and, with a large amount 
of data, 408 data. The data used is assumed to be 
normal because the data used are more than 30 data. 
The summary statistics of the variables in this paper 
are in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Summary of Statistics of Variables 
 TQ_1 DIS FS LEVERAGE SIZE 
 Mean  1.5676   0.3913  0.2989  0.1867  14.5960 
 Median  0.9905  0.4193  0.1607  0.1093  14.3260 
 Maximum  12.962  0.9818  0.9977  2.5910  19.5050 
 Minimum  0.2745  0.0000  0.0000  0.0002  11.5160 
 Std. Dev.  1.6655  0.3123  0.3233  0.2755  1.5641 
 Skewness  3.8955  0.0748  0.6105  5.5796  0.5960 
 Kurtosis  22.314  1.5595  1.9949  44.000  3.1066 
 Observations  408  408  408  408  408 
 
From Table 4, it can be explained that the mean 
of TQ_1 is 1.57, and this value is greater than 1. This 
data il-lustrates that the average market value of a 
company's equity stock is higher than the book value 
of its equity. On average, the ownership of companies 
by the domestic institutional shareholders is more 
elevated than that of the foreign shareholders. It is 
described that the mean of share ownership by 
domestic institutions is 39.13 percent, and foreign 
institutions are 29.89 percent. The company's debt 
condition is, on average, 18.67 percent of its total 
assets. On average, most of the company's financing 
sources come from equity. Because of the significant 
variation in the company's assets being sampled, the 
company's size is calculated by a natural logarithm of 
the company's total assets. The mean size is not much 
different from the median of size. Covariance and 
correlation of the sample are described in Table 5. 
Table 5 explains a pretty high correlation between the 
domestic institution shareholders and the foreign 
shareholders, 0.7787. By using the rule of the thumb 
0.800, this correlation is acceptable. The specific 
treatment to eliminate this correlation is needed in the 
data regression. 
Chow and Hausman’s tests are carried out to 
find the best model. The results of the Chow test are 
described in Table 6, and the results of the Hausman 
test are described in Table 7. 
 
Table 5. Covariance and Correlation of Variables. 
Correlation Covariance TQ_1  DIS FS LEVERAGE  SIZE  
TQ_1  2.7671     
 1.0000     
DIS 0.0743 0.0973    
 0.1433 1.0000    
FS  -0.0327 -0.0784 0.1043   
 -0.0609 -0.7787 1.0000   
LEVERAGE  -0.0072 -0.0010 0.0017 0.0757  
 -0.0158 -0.0113 0.0195 1.0000  
SIZE  0.4319 -0.0154 0.0032 0.0132 2.4404 
 0.1662 -0.0316 0.0063 0.0307 1.0000 
 
Table 6. Chow Test Result 
Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
Cross-section F 17.1172 (101,302) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 777.5561 101 0.0000 
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Table 7. Hausman Test Result 
Test Summary Chi-Sq.Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
Cross-section random 9.8806 4 0.0425 
 
Table 6 shows the Prob. values from the Cross-
section F significance 0.001, and Table 7 shows the 
Prob. value from the Cross-section random 
significant 0.05. From the results of these two tests, the 
fit model is the Fixed Effect Model. 
 
Because the sample from this study has more 
cross-section numbers (N = 102) than time (T = 4), 
there is a possibility of heteroscedasticity (Gujarati, 
2003). Data in this sample have heteroskedasticity in 
cross-section and period data. When processing data 
using the E-Views program, the treatments are: 
1. Selecting Cross-section weights that serve to 
ensure that the data to be processed is 
heteroscedasticity.  
2. Selecting the White cross-section menu and 
covariance (no.d.f.correction) to reduce the 
heteroscedasticity effect. 
The results of the data regression are described 
in Table 8. The results obtained in equation (3) in 
Table 8 show that DIS has a positive and significant 
relationship with the firm value measured by TQ_1. 
Every increase in share ownership by the domestic 
institutional shareholders is 0.1, and then the firm 
value will increase by 0.0244 measured by TQ_1. 
However, it needs to be examined further, whether 
there is a turning point or not on increasing the 
number of shares by the domestic institutional 
shareholders to the firm value. The turning point 
calculation to find out this threshold is as in equation 
(3). When the domestic institutional shareholders 
have exceeded 35.26 percent, each new share 
ownership by the domestic institutional shareholders 
increase 0.1; the firm value will decrease by 0.0244. 
 
TQ_1 = 7.1095 - 1.3034 DIS + 1.8484 (DIS)2 (3) 
 
∂TQ_1
∂DIS
               = - 1.3034 + 2(1.8484) DIS 
3.6968 DIS    = 1.3034 
DIS                = 0.3526 
DIS                ≈ 35.26 percent 
 
Table 8 Regressions’ Results of Shareholders on Firm Value 
Variable Dependent Variable (TQ_1) 
Independent Variable: (3) (4) 
Intercept 6.7339** (26.3709) 7.1095** (11.2913) 
DIS 0.2438** (11.6162) -1.3034* (-3.2328) 
(DIS)2   1.8484** (3.8041) 
FS 0.1514** (12.903) 1.2273** (6.3856) 
(FS)2   -1.2889** (-6.6921) 
Control Variable:     
LEVERAGE 0.2513** (6.2291) 0.2174** (4.4552) 
SIZE -0.3668** (-21.6015) -0.3873** (-9.1660) 
R-squared 0.9692 0.9710 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9585 0.9607 
F-statistic 90.6105** 93.9638** 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.1570 2.0901 
Notes: **p<0.001; *p<0.01. The t-statistics in parentheses 
 
In equation (4) in Table 8, it is described that 
Foreign Shareholder has a positive and significant 
relationship with the firm value as measured by 
TQ_1. Every increase in share ownership by the 
foreign shareholders is 0.1; the firm value will 
increase by 0.0151, measured by TQ_1. However, this 
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relationship is not always positive and significant. 
The turning point calculation to find out this 
threshold is as in equation (4). When the foreign 
shareholders’ ownership exceeds 47.61 percent, each 
increase in the foreign shareholding of 0.1 will reduce 
the firm value by 0.0151. 
 
TQ_1 = 7.1095 + 1.2273 FS - 1.2889 (FS)2 (4) 
 
∂TQ_1
∂FS
                  = 1.2273 - 2(1.2889) FS 
2.577836 FS     = 1.2273 
FS                     = 0.4761 
FS                     ≈ 47.61 percent 
 
The domestic institutional shareholders and 
foreign shareholders alike affect the firm value 
positively and significantly. From the coefficient 
value in Table 8, the domestic institutional 
shareholders have a higher influence on the firm 
value than that of the foreign shareholders. The 
coefficient of the domestic institutional shareholders 
is 0.244, and the coefficient of the foreign shareholders 
is 0.151. It can be explained that domestic institutional 
shareholders are more dominant in determining the 
value of the company than that of the foreign 
shareholders. This result shows that the positive 
relationship between the domestic institutional 
shareholders is the similar as explained by Jafarinejad 
et al. (2015)) From observations of changes in share 
ownership in the sample, the majority of share 
ownership by the domestic institutional shareholders 
is stable. In resume, the first hypothesis in this paper 
is accepted. 
This paper gives slightly different results from 
the research explained by Thanatawee (2014). The 
difference is the foreign shareholders who cannot 
influence the firm value because they cannot conduct 
effective monitoring (Thanatawee, 2014). For the case 
in Indonesia, there is a majority of the foreign 
shareholders (see Table 4) in some of the samples so 
that they can control and monitor effectively to the 
firm performance. From observations to sample, the 
foreign shareholders have a representative in the 
Board of Directors (BoD) of the firm. This is a strategy 
to reduce agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Also, some of the foreign shareholders are companies 
that are majority-owned by domestic taxpayers. That 
is why the foreign shareholders have a positive and 
significant impact on the firm value.  
The influence of the shareholders to the firm 
value is not linear, and it is similar to Lozano et al. 
(2016) explained before, but it is a different shape. 
Lozano et al. (2016) state that the influence is U-
shaped and this paper finds the inverted U-shaped 
for the influencing. For specific ownership, the 
shareholders influencing turn out from a positive to a 
negative relation. The more share ownership, the 
more control, and finally the shareholder can 
influence the firm strategy benefit to the majority 
shareholder, such as increasing related party 
transaction (Bona-Sánchez et al., 2017), and 
decreasing cash dividend by holding cash in the firm 
(Karpavicius & Yu, 2017; Li, Zhou, Yan, & Zhang, 
2020). For the domestic institutional shareholders, 
this threshold is smaller than that of the foreign 
shareholders. The threshold of the domestic 
institutional shareholders is 35.26 percent, and the 
foreign shareholders are 47.61 percent. In the resume, 
the second hypothesis is accepted.        
After passing the threshold, the more significant 
ownership of the domestic institutional shareholders, 
the firm value is not the primary purpose of the 
shareholders. These shareholders have other primary 
purposes than the firm value. The state shareholders 
are the domestic institutional shareholders in this 
paper and this one reason why the threshold exists. 
The state shareholders have other primary purposes 
besides the firm value, as stated by Song et al. (2015). 
The more share ownership, the shareholders have 
more control over the firm. The controlling 
shareholders can get more private benefits (Li et al., 
2020) and monitor management (Crisóstomo et al., 
2020) and finally can have a negative influence on the 
firm value.  
After observing some of the samples in this 
paper, some conglomerates have some firms in this 
sample. These conglomerates use the foreign 
company to own the firm in this sample. The 
ownership of the conglomerates in the firm in this 
sample is more than 50 percent. Relating to the 
regression results in this paper, the foreign 
shareholders have a significant negative relation to 
the firm value after passing the threshold. This 
condition is an indication that the conglomerates 
have other primary mission than that of the firm 
value. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
The domestic institutional shareholders and the 
foreign shareholders positively relate the firm value 
before a particular threshold. After passing the 
threshold, the relation turns out to be negatively 
significant. The relationship of the domestic 
institutional shareholders is bigger than that of the 
foreign shareholders. This difference has explained 
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the value of the coefficient from the regression. The 
relation between the shareholders and the firm 
value is not linear but inverted U-shaped. The 
threshold of the domestic institutional shareholders 
is smaller than that of the foreign shareholders.  
 To obtain the firm's optimum value from the 
shareholders’ composition, the investor interested in 
the firm can combine the shareholders’ composition. 
Based on this paper's data, the optimum 
combination is the ownership of the domestic 
institutional shareholders not more than 35.26 
percent and of the foreign shareholders not more 
than 47.61 percent.  The share of domestic 
institutional shareholders in companies with the 
TALF code from 2014 to 2017 remained at 88.146 
percent, while the share of foreign shareholders is 
11.05 percent in 2014 and 11.28 percent in 2017. The 
firm value measured by Tobin Q declined, 1.886 in 
2014, and 0.782 in 2017. This data explains that the 
share ownership by domestic institutions that 
exceeds a certain amount, in this paper, 35.26 
percent, negatively affects the company's value. 
This paper only uses data from the 
manufacturing industry listed in IDX, and data year 
is four years. This paper's results can be used as 
comparative data for making decisions, both for 
manufacturing companies and other companies 
related to tax amnesty policy applied in 2016 and 
2017. It is also suggested to do more research with 
data from other industries and a long-term period. 
By adding more data, the analysis can be more 
profound and be more varied.  
 
REFERENCES 
Bajo, E., Croci, E., & Marinelli, N. (2020). 
Institutional investor networks and firm value. 
Journal of Business Research, 112, 65–80. 
Bhat, P. (2017). Effect of Foreign Ownership on Firm 
Performance and Shareholder Value: Evidence 
from India. University of Massachusetts, 
Boston. 
Bona-Sánchez, C., Fernández-Senra, C. L., & Pérez-
Alemán, J. (2017). Related-party transactions, 
dominant owners and firm value. BRQ Business 
Research Quarterly, 20(1), 4–17. 
Brigham, E. F., & Daves, P. R. (2007). Intermediate 
Financial Management (Ninth Edit). Ohio, USA: 
Thomson Higher Education. 
Bank risk profile, good corporate governance, and 
firm values in go public banking companies in 
Indonesia. Journal of Economics, Business, and 
Accountancy Ventura, 20(1), 41-46 
Chia, Y. E., Lim, K. P., & Goh, K. L. (2020). Liquidity 
and firm value in an emerging market: 
Nonlinearity, political connections, and 
corporate ownership. North American Journal of 
Economics and Finance, 52, 101169. 
Crisóstomo, V. L., Brandão, I. de F., & López-
Iturriaga, F. J. (2020). Large shareholders’ power 
and the quality of corporate governance: An 
analysis of Brazilian firms. Research in 
International Business and Finance, 51, 101076. 
Du, M., & Boateng, A. (2015). State ownership, 
institutional effects, and value creation in cross-
border mergers & acquisitions by Chinese 
firms. International Business Review, 24(3), 430–
442. 
Giriati. (2016). Free Cash Flow, Dividend Policy, 
Investment Opportunity Set, Opportunistic 
Behavior, and Firm's Value: (A Study About 
Agency Theory). Procedia - Social and Behavioral 
Sciences, 219, 248–254. 
Gugler, K., Mueller, D. C., & Yurtoglu, B. B. (2003). 
The Effects of Ownership Concentration and 
Identity on Investment Performance: An 
International Comparison (No. Project #8090.). 
Vienna. 
Gujarati, D. N. (2003). Basic Econometrics (Fourth 
Edi). New York: McGraw-HiII/Irwin.  
He, W., & Kyaw, N. N. A. (2018). Ownership 
structure and investment decisions of Chinese 
SOEs. Research in International Business and 
Finance, 43, 48–57. 
Herlina, E. (2017). Governance in Indonesia banking 
industries as an effort to improve their national 
competitive-ness. Journal of Economics, Business, 
& Accountancy Ventura, 20(2), 149-160. 
Houmes, R., & Chira, I. (2015). The effect of 
ownership structure on the price-earnings ratio 
- returns anomaly. International Review of 
Financial Analysis, 37, 140–147.  
Jafarinejad, M., Jory, S. R., & Ngo, T. N. (2015). The 
effects of institutional ownership on the value 
and risk of diversified firms. International 
Review of Financial Analysis, 40, 207–219.  
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of 
the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, 
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 3(4), 305–360.  
Kaldor, N. (1966). Marginal Productivity and the 
Macro-Economic Theories of Distribution: 
Comment on Samuelson and Modigliani. The 
Review of Economic Studies, 33(4), 309–319.  
Karpavicius, S., & Yu, F. (2017). How institutional 
monitoring creates value : Evidence for the free 
cash flow hypothesis. International Review of 
Economics and Finance, 52(July 2016), 127–146.  
Li, W., Zhou, J., Yan, Z., & Zhang, H. (2020). 
Muhammad Rifky Santoso: Shareholders and Firm Value for Manufacturing Companies … 
 
147 
Controlling shareholder share pledging and 
firm cash dividends. Emerging Markets Review, 
42, 100671. 
Lozano, M. B., Martínez, B., & Pindado, J. (2016). 
Corporate governance, ownership, and firm 
value: Drivers of ownership as a good corporate 
governance mechanism. International Business 
Review, 25(6), 1333–1343.  
Oswald, S. L., & Jahera, Jr, J. S. (1991). Research 
Notes And Communications The Influence Of 
Ownership On Performance: An Empirical 
Study. Strategic Management Journal, 12, 321–
326. 
Setiawan, R., & Pradana, E. W. (2020). Institutional 
Ownership, Newly Appointed CEO, and 
Dividend Initiation. Journal of Economics, 
Business, & Accountancy Ventura, 22(3), 435-443 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large 
Shareholders and Corporate Control. Journal of 
Political Economy, 94(3, Part 1), 461–488.  
Song, J., Wang, R., & Cavusgil, S. T. (2015). State 
ownership and market orientation in China’s 
public firms: An agency theory perspective. 
International Business Review, 24(4), 690–699.  
Thanatawee, Y. (2014). Institutional Ownership and 
Firm Value in Thailand. Asian Journal of Business 
and Accounting, 7(2), 1–22.  
Tobin, J., & Brainard, W. C. (1976). Asset Markets 
and the Cost of Capital (No. 427). Connecticut. 
Vintilă, G., & Gherghina, Ş. C. (2013). Board of 
Directors Independence and Firm Value : 
Empirical Evidence Based on the Bucharest 
Stock Exchange Listed Companies. 
International Journal of Economics and Financial 
Issues, 3(4), 885–900.  
Wang, B. (2018). Ownership, institutions, and firm 
value: Cross-provincial evidence from China. 
Research in International Business and Finance, 44, 
547–565.  
Yung, K., & Jian, Y. (2017). Effects of the shareholder 
base on firm behavior and firm value in China. 
International Review of Economics and Finance, 
49(January), 370–385.   
 
 
